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APPLYING RAWLSIAN SOCIAL
JUSTICE TO WELFARE REFORM: AN
UNEXPECTED FINDING FOR SOCIAL WORK
MAHASWETA M. BANERJEE
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School of Social Welfare
This paper sketches social workers' understanding of social justice and
reliance on Rawls (1971), highlights findings about "hard to employ"
welfare recipients facing welfare reform, and articulates the parameters of
Rawlsian justice (Rawls, 1999a; 2001) with particular emphasis on people
who have been on welfare for long. The paper shows that social workers do
not have any space to maneuver in Rawlsian justice to uphold justice for
long-term welfare recipients, and welfare reform's "work first" stipulation
does not violate Rawlsian justice. The paper raises some questions about
social workers' continued reliance on Rawls. It suggests social workers
update the literature to reflect Rawls's revised and clarified vision of justice
and apply it appropriately.
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In a Theory of Justice and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,
Rawls (1971; 1999a; 2001) conceptualized the meaning of social
justice, and laid out the foundation that would allow all citizens
to get justice in society. Rawls encapsulated his very elaborate
thinking about social justice in two elegant principles. The second
principle of justice brings disadvantaged people to the forefront:
"social and economic inequalities ... are to be to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (Rawls, 2001,
pp. 42-43). Given such strong and clear emphasis on maximizing
the well-being of poor people, it is not surprising that social
workers unanimously agree that Rawlsian justice is highly suited
to furthering our justice concerns related to various people with
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whom we work (Figueira-McDonough, 1993; Reisch, 2002; Reisch
and Taylor, 1983; Van Soest, 1994; 1995; Van Soest and Garcia, 2003;
Wakefield, 1988a; 1988b; 1998). The question is: Can Rawlsian
justice also help social workers to promote justice for long-term
welfare recipients in the context of the welfare reform of 1996?
It is important to answer this question for three reasons: a)
social workers are committed to bringing about social justice
with and for people who are poor, vulnerable, oppressed, and
marginalized (NASW, 1999; Reamer, 1998); b) social workers have
uniformly and heavily drawn from Rawls (1971) to promote so-
cial justice in micro to macro levels of practice; c) social work-
ers critique the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act [PRWORA] (1996, P.L. 104-193), henceforth
welfare reform, as unjust because of its sole emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility to gain economic self-sufficiency without a
concomitant focus on social responsibility to make this possible
(Anderson, Halter and Gryzlak, 2004; Long, 2000; Stoesz, 2000;
Reisch, 2002; Taylor and Barusch, 2004).
Interestingly however, despite social workers' reliance on
Rawls (1971) to promote justice with varied populations, no social
worker has applied Rawlsian justice to critique welfare reform.
In light of social workers' high regard for Rawls to promote social
justice for varied problems, and Rawls's apparently serious con-
cern for delivering justice to poor people, as evidenced through
the second principle of justice, it is worth examining whether
Rawlsian justice can help us promote social justice as we define
it for long-term welfare recipients in this era of welfare reform.
Such an examination may help to clarify whether we can continue
to rely on Rawls to develop a justification that would be needed
by policy makers to attend to our advocacy demands related to
long-term welfare recipients.
To this end, this paper briefly sketches social workers' under-
standing of social justice and their reliance on Rawls (1971), high-
lights some recent findings related to long-term welfare recipients
in the context of welfare reform, and more fully articulates the
main parameter and specific elements of Rawlsian justice (Rawls,
1999a; 2001) as they relate to adults compelled to rely on public
assistance for long. Specifically, the paper discusses Rawls's no-
tion of distributive justice, his two principles of justice, definition
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of least advantaged members and "surfers," and distinction be-
tween allocative justice and distributive justice. This examination
reveals: a) welfare reform with its work first stipulation does not
violate Rawlsian justice, and b) there is no space in Rawlsian
justice that allows social workers to maneuver it to uphold justice
as they define it for long-term welfare recipients. The paper raises
questions about social workers' continued reliance on Rawls to
promote justice, especially for long-term welfare recipients, when
Rawls has revised and clarified his thesis on justice. It suggests
social workers update the literature to reflect Rawls's revised po-
sition on justice so we may appropriately apply it for our causes.
Social Workers' Views on Social Justice,
Rawlsian Social Justice, and Welfare Reform
Social Workers and Social Justice
The NASW Code of Ethics (1999, p. 18) requires social workers
to promote social justice so that all people, and particularly poor,
vulnerable, oppressed and marginalized people, "have equal ac-
cess to resources, employment, services, and opportunities that
they require to meet their human needs and to develop fully."
However, the code does not define social justice, and a review of
the social work literature indicates that it's meaning and strategies
vary among social workers (Beverly and McSweeney, 1987; Ca-
puto, 2002; Chatterjee and D'Aprix, 2002; Figueira-McDonough,
1993; Reisch, 2002; Saleebey, 1990; Van Soest, 1994; Van Soest and
Garcia, 2003; Wakefield, 1998).
Among the available definitions of social justice, lately social
workers tend to forward Barker's (1999, p. 451) definition: "an
ideal condition in which all members of a society have the same
basic rights, protections, opportunities, obligations, and social
benefits." It is possible that this definition is cited most frequently
not because it reflects our profession's stance on social justice,
but rather because of its conciseness. Whereas Barker's definition
emphasizes equality in social, economic, and political spheres,
and includes the idea of obligation to acquire justice or benefits,
not all social workers share this view. Overall social workers agree
social justice entails equality in certain spheres to ascertain fair
distribution of socio-economic-political resources for all people
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(Beverly and McSweeney, 1987; Reisch, 2002; Saleebey, 1990; Van
Soest, 1994; Wakefield, 1988a). Further, these social workers pro-
mote social justice on various grounds such as meeting people's
basic and developmental needs, equal moral worth, redress, egal-
itarianism, altruism, and gift of citizenship. Last, while there is
much discussion on what people need so that there is justice, there
is very little discussion about whether people have any obligation
to society, such as getting wage employment, to get justice.
Recently, Reisch (2002) has identified five principles of a just
society: holding the most vulnerable populations harmless in the
distribution of societal resources, mutuality, emphasizing preven-
tion, stressing multiple ways of providing access to services and
benefits, and enabling clients and constituencies to define their
own situations and contribute to the development and evaluation
of solutions. In place of obligation, Reisch promotes the idea of
mutuality or individual's "capacity to repay society for its assis-
tance at some time, in some way" (p. 351). He believes a sense of
mutuality would balance individual's rights and responsibilities
and would address welfare reform's focus on "responsibility,
but not agency, over societal obligation" (p. 351). In the context
of welfare reform, he sums up his vision of justice for people
facing its dire consequences by stating that a just society is one
where people "can live decent lives and realize their full human
potential. This requires the elimination of those policies that di-
minish people's sense of control over their lives ... expansion of
those programs that enable people to exercise personal freedom
by removing the fear of economic and physical calamity from
their lives and making them feel like integral and valued parts of
society" (p. 351).
Social Workers and Rawlsian Social Justice
A review of the social work literature shows that almost all
authors at least refer to Rawls (1971), if not also draw on aspects
of his justice theory to discuss or advance their justice concerns.
First, in relation to libertarian, utilitarian, and egalitarian theories
of social justice, social workers unanimously agree that Rawls's
(1971) theory of justice is most suited to our purposes; some
prefer Rawlsian justice to others because of its egalitarianism
while others favor it to promote distributive justice (Conrad,
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1988; Figueira-McDonough, 1993; Goldberg, 1992; Longres and
Scanlon, 2001; Reisch, 2002; Reisch and Taylor, 1983; Van Soest,
1994; 1995; Wakefield, 1988a; 1998; Wright and Bodnar, 1992).
Some draw on Rawls's "difference principle," guarantee of a "so-
cial minimum," along with emphasis on "social primary goods"
to promote justice in various fields and aspects of social work
practice (Beverly and McSweeney, 1987; Figueira-McDonough,
1993; Raber and Conrad, 1999; Reisch and Taylor, 1983; Wake-
field, 1988a; Wright and Bodnar, 1992). Second, social workers
rely on Rawls to cover the broad spectrum of micro-macro so-
cial work justice concerns. For example, some pull the micro-
macro divide together to discuss social justice (Reamer, 1998).
Others focus more exclusively on clinical social work and dis-
cuss psychotherapy with people with mental health problems
(Dean, 1998; Swenson, 1998; Wakefield, 1988; 1998); social ad-
ministration issues related to staff morale in times of agency re-
structuring as a result of scarce resources (Raber and Conrad,
1999; Reisch and Taylor, 1983); policy-practice issues such as bal-
ance of peace and justice (Figuera-McDonough, 1993; Linhorst,
2002; Van Soest, 1995); or social work education related to clin-
ical practice, policy, research, and field education (Conrad 1988;
Longres and Scanlon, 2001; Reid and Billups, 1986; Reisch, 2002;
Swenson, 1998; Van Soest, 1994; 1995; Wakefield, 1988a; 1988b;
1998;).
Third, there is very little critique of Rawlsian justice by social
workers, except extremely minimal statements noting that Rawl-
sian justice maintains the status quo (Reisch and Taylor, 1983),
results in minimal distributive justice for poor people (Wakefield,
1988a; 1998), and emphasizes liberty over equality (Reisch, 2002).
Although hindsight shows that these criticisms are extremely
pertinent, in relation to the space devoted to incorporate his ideas
into social work, the brevity of words devoted to these criticisms
undermines their significance. Last, one notes that some articles
related to social justice do not directly cite Rawls. But, a few social
workers are regarded as authorities on social justice, or Rawl-
sian social justice (Barker, 1999; Beverly and McSweeney, 1987;
Saleebey, 1990; Wakefield, 1988a; 1988b; Van Soest, 1994; 1995).
Consequently, authors of this last group of articles uniformly cite
these stalwarts to define or discuss their social justice concerns or
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to refer to Rawlsian justice. So, anyone reading the combined vol-
ume of our social justice literature would conclude that recourse
to Rawlsian justice would allow us to address all our social justice
problems. It was this belief that directed the author to read Rawls
(1971; 1999a; 1999b; 2001). The assumption was that although
social workers had not applied Rawls to critique welfare reform, a
thorough understanding of Rawls may allow us to create a ratio-
nale that would enable adults who have been on welfare for long
for a variety of micro-macro reasons get justice, instead of living
through the daily hardships and humiliations entailed in the op-
pressive work first and time limit requirements of welfare reform.
Social Workers and Welfare Reform
Welfare reform is the most substantial welfare policy change
in America since 1935. A significant change relates to the avail-
ability of cash assistance to poor families with children, now
known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families or TANE It
requires all adults to be personally responsible for their economic
well being by going to work first, irrespective of personal, inter-
personal, and structural barriers to work. Cash assistance can only
be obtained on a temporary basis. Also, there is a life time limit on
the availability of cash assistance. Whereas the limit is five years
from the federal government, states can impose their own rules
to define both work first and time limit.
Shortly after its enactment, the welfare rolls reduced dramat-
ically in most states as people who could work were able to find
jobs in a then booming economy (US Department of Health and
Human Services, 1999; Pearce, 2000). Early studies conducted in
various states found that about 50 percent to 70 percent of TANF
leavers were employed immediately after exiting the system,
although their average earning was usually below the poverty
level (Acs and Loprest, 2001). However, some leavers found it
difficult to retain their temporary, low-skilled jobs, and cycled in
and out of welfare (Anderson, Halter, and Gryzlak, 2004; Loprest,
2002), while others found it hard to even get a job (Zedlewski,
Nelson, Edin, Koball, Pomper, and Roberts, 2003).
The primary interest of this paper is the last two groups of
people, variously termed as hard-to-employ, welfare-to-work,
and long-term welfare recipients. Research shows they face nu-
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merous barriers to employment such as inadequate education,
job skills and experience; health, mental health, and substance
abuse issues; domestic violence; lack of childcare, transportation,
and jobs (Anderson et al, 2004; Banerjee, 2002; 2003; Jackson,
Tienda, and Huang, 2001; Primus, Rawlings, Larin, and Porter,
1999; Solomon, 2001; Taylor and Barusch, 2004; Zedlewski et al.,
2003). They need special assistance to develop their personal ca-
pabilities and to address their personal and inter-personal issues;
there needs to be investment in social capital development so that
the work first requirement can bear fruit for many although not
all (Anderson et al., 2004; Banerjee, 2003; Jackson, Tienda, and
Huang, 2001; Prince and Austin, 2001; Taylor and Barusch, 2004).
Some (Anderson, Halter and Gryzlak, 2004; Taylor and Barusch,
2004) promote a halt to work first and time limit for some long-
term welfare recipients arguing that thoughtful investment in
human and social capital development is required before such
people can strive towards economic self-sufficiency; additionally
a few even need a waiver from the work requirement. While there
are local programs designed primarily to help long-term welfare
recipients find jobs and attend to other personal issues, research
also shows that the success rates of these programs vary and tend
to be modest because it takes time to bring about the dramatic
changes in personal self-efficacy and societal inclusion that are
necessary to make employment and economic self-sufficiency as
emphasized by welfare reform a sustainable reality (Anderson
et al, 2004; Banerjee, 2003; Prince and Austin, 2001; Schorr, 2001;
Stoesz, 2000; Taylor and Barusch, 2004).
Social workers criticize welfare reform on various grounds.
For example, some (Abramovitz, 1996; Jimenez, 1999; Segal and
Kilty, 2003) note that welfare reform is primarily designed to
discipline poor women, especially poor black single mothers,
and to impose mainstream values of work, marriage, and child-
bearing. They also express concern about poor women's inability
to escape domestic violence, or harmful relationships with un-
desirable men because of fewer options. Moreover, critics note
that while undoubtedly there is value to work and a work ethic,
inability to get or retain a minimum wage job in the secondary
labor market is more complicated than mere unwillingness to
work and desire to live off welfare benefits as some assume
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(Anderson et al., 2004; Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Banerjee, 2003;
Schorr, 2001; Segal and Kilty, 2003). Research has shown some
of the creative ways through which poor single mothers make
ends meet (Edin and Lein, 1997), the hardships they endure as
a result of welfare reform's work first stipulations (Zedlewski et
al., 2003), and their reluctance to return to welfare despite job loss
yet the need to return not because of calculation but because of
desperation (Anderson et al., 2004).
Despite these findings, when welfare reform came up for re-
authorization discussion in 2002, President Bush emphasized the
drop in welfare rolls as an indicator of its success, and pushed
for an even higher percentage of welfare caseload to be involved
in work, and even more hours of work than its initial expecta-
tions (National Conference of State Legislators, 2002). However,
research findings cast doubt on the feasibility of this recommen-
dation. Thus, welfare reform's implications on hard-to-employ
long-term welfare recipients become a social justice concern for
social workers because their basic and developmental needs are
in jeopardy (Reisch, 2002).
To sum up, bringing about social justice is important for social
workers. Some point out that welfare reform is unjust. Many
rely on Rawls to promote justice for people. Thus, it is worth
examining how Rawlsian justice may help us to promote jus-
tice for long-term welfare recipients. Next I devote considerable
space to discussing Rawlsian justice because except for Wakefield
(1988a; 1988b; 1998), no other social worker has elaborated on
the Rawlsian theory of justice. However, Wakefield discusses
Rawls's 1971 theory of justice and that too in the limited context of
psychotherapy as a social justice concern. Rawls has twice revised
his 1971 theory of justice (Rawls, 1999a; 2001). In his final thesis,
Rawls (2001) clarifies that the revised theory is not about applied
moral philosophy, but rather it is a political conceptualization of
justice.
A Critique of the Parameter and Selected Elements
of Rawlsian Distributive Justice
Distributive Justice
Broadly, Rawlsian justice (Rawls, 1971; 1999a; 2001) lays out
how political, economic, and social resources are to be distributed
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in an ideally just society so that all citizens can get their fair
and due share or social justice. In envisioning this society, Rawls
assumes: a) all citizens are free and equal, reasonable and ratio-
nal, and normal and fully cooperating members of a pluralist
society, b) the "basic structure" or the government is primarily
responsible for creating a just society, and c) co-operation and
reciprocity among citizens and institutions are critical for the
stability of this just society. Distributive justice results when the
government, its citizens, and institutions fulfill their respective
duties and obligations.
Implications of Distributive Justice on Work and Income. In Rawl-
sian justice both the government and its citizens involved in
various social, economic, and political institutions have their
respective roles to play in sharing the benefits and burdens of
societal functioning. As such, the government has an obligation
to maintain justice through its constitution, legislation, and im-
plementation bodies by accurately following the procedures of
his two principles of justice (to be elaborated shortly). Simultane-
ously, all citizens have a duty to co-operate with the government
and its rules. One rule requires that all people contribute their
labor and/or capital to producing material goods and services
needed by society. Such production takes place in a more or
less free market economy because of its efficiency to coordinate
demand and supply as well as ability to stabilize the economy.
Thus, citizens' fair and due economic share from society,
at least those who need wage employment to make a living is
crucially tied to their pay and benefits package which are a pre-
determined contract between two parties in a market economy.
People who depend on wage employment, earn according to their
ability, merit, effort, and contribution, as well as what the market
is willing to pay for their labor based on demand and supply.
Rawls specifies that if some people are more talented and in
higher demand because of scarcity, they should be paid more
than those who are less talented and more easily and abundantly
available. Conversely, people who are unhappy with their wages
should enhance their educational and occupational skills to earn
more. However, it is important to note that social cooperation,
meaning work or wage employment, is a critical ingredient in
Rawlsian justice. But Rawls does not require work to be a basic
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right, nor does he require the government to have a full em-
ployment policy or set a minimum wage standard because these
would interfere with the functioning of a more or less free market
economy.
Implications of Distributive Justice on Welfare Assistance. Despite
Rawls's preference for a more or less free market economy where
there is reasonably full employment, and people cannot be "forced
to engage in work that is highly productive; work they do de-
pends on them based on market incentive" (2001, p. 64), he also
recognizes this economy's inability to meet "claims of need"
(1999a, p. 84). A valid claim of need arises only when people co-
operate with the work requirement, but fail to make an adequate
wage to make ends meet, or when they are temporarily unable to
work because of ill-health, or due to the seasonal or temporary
nature of their jobs. Only under these three circumstances, Rawls
requires the government to pay a "social minimum," or welfare
assistance.
Rawls does not address how much or what constitutes the
social minimum, but overall it appears that the social minimum
should meet working poor people's needs and fit into the require-
ments of the second principle of justice. However, he is clear that
the social minimum should be less than the value of market wage
to retain the incentive for work. He maintains that the legislature
should determine how much public revenue ought to be allocated
for social minimum by keeping working poor people's cost of liv-
ing in perspective with other public expenditure and total public
revenue, reflecting standard public policy making practices.
Rawlsian Principles of Justice
Rawls expects the government to adhere to two principles of
justice to ensure distributive justice for all. The two principles of
justice are:
a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible
with the same scheme of liberties for all.
b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:
first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second,
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they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society (Rawls, 1999a; 2001, p. 42-43).
The first principle is known as the equal liberty principle;
it guarantees equal political and civil liberties, such as freedom
of speech, assembly, religion, property ownership, and political
participation to all citizens. The first part of the second principle is
known as the fair equality of opportunity principle; it guarantees
equal access to education and work for citizens with equal ability
and talent, irrespective of their socio-economic class background.
The second part of the second principle is known as the difference
principle, and it guarantees that inevitable and desirable socio-
economic inequalities are to the maximum advantage of the least
advantaged members of society (to be defined later).
Further, Rawls imposes a lexical ordering to these principles,
which means that the second principle cannot be given priority
over the first principle, and that the fair equality of opportunity
principle has precedence over the difference principle. And, it is
important to note that Rawls (2001) has demoted the position of
the difference principle from being the first part of the second
principle to the last part of the second principle (Rawls, 1971).
Critique of the Two Principles of Justice. The principle of equal
liberty is very helpful because it treats all citizens as equals,
irrespective of their race, gender, class, national origin, religion,
ability and so on. But, it is also worth noting that these political
and civil freedoms are not anything more than what the American
constitution already provides its citizens.
Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. Because the two-part sec-
ond principle is so appealing, particularly with regard to poor
people, it is important to understand its implications. The fair
equality of opportunity principle does not guarantee equal access,
but rather it guarantees fair access to work and education because
it states that all people with equal ability and talent, irrespective
of their class background, must have equal access to education
and work. This principle is very helpful for talented poor in-
dividuals because they have the same access to education and
work as talented rich individuals. But when two persons do not
have the same ability they are not required to have the same
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access to education or work. However, Rawls recognizes that
poor people's background may interfere with their opportunities
to realize their abilities and talents. Thus, Rawls recommends,
but does not require, that extra resources may be spent on poor
children's education, until they finish high school. Disappoint-
ingly, however, Rawls does not specify extra resource allocation
for remedial education, post-secondary education, or vocational
training for poor adults who must work to earn a living. In addi-
tion to this major limitation, this noteworthy justice principle with
high potential for bettering the life chances of poor children comes
with a reciprocity clause attached to the difference principle.
The Difference Principle. The difference principle appears to be
the most beneficial principle of justice for poor people because
it is not about treating all citizens equally, but rather it is about
treating poor people especially so that they can maximally in-
crease their well-being. However, Rawls does not elaborate much
on how socio-economic inequalities are to be precisely addressed
to make them to the greatest advantage of poor people. Overall,
he requires the government, specifically the legislature, to apply
the difference principle to set its social and economic policies by
comparing various schemes of cooperation and choosing that
in which the poorest people fare the best and then apply that
scheme to setting the social minimum. Rawls clarifies that even
in an ideally just society there will be inequalities in any scheme
of cooperation because, as noted earlier, economic distribution
takes place via the market place where people earn a living based
on their talent-related contributions, and some are naturally more
talented. Some point out that the difference principle amounts to
trickle down effects (Wakefield, 1988a; 1998), while others point
out that even if it betters poor people's economic situation, it
can create vast inequalities in power and influence, as well as a
distribution can be just even if it violates the difference principle
(Nathanson, 1998).
The Reciprocity Clause in the Difference Principle. The difference
principle comes with a critically important reciprocity clause,
which reflects Rawls's central concern for fairness to all citizens.
Rawls explains that, "reciprocity is a moral idea situated between
impartiality... on the one side and mutual advantage on the
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other," (1971; 1999a; 2001, p. 77), expressing "concern for all mem-
bers of society" (2001, p. 71). Consequently, the reciprocity clause
states that socio-economic inequalities, as well as any extra ex-
penditure on poor children's education, also must benefit "others
as well as ourselves ... even if it uses the idea of maximizing
the expectations of the least advantaged, the difference princi-
ple is essentially a principle of reciprocity" (Rawls, 2001, p. 64).
Thus, while both the fair equality of opportunity principle and
the difference principle allow extra expenditure to educate poor
children, yet such extra expenditure is permissible only when
"more attention to the better endowed (is given)... otherwise
not" (1999a, pp. 86-87). So, in effect the difference principle cre-
ates the illusion of treating poor people especially because the
reciprocity clause attached to it takes away this advantage from
poor people. Because of ignoring extra-expenditure to remedy
poor adults' education and occupational skills in the fair equality
of opportunity principle, and the reciprocity clause in the dif-
ference principle, it is hard to understand how Rawlsian justice
can help poor children and adults get ahead in life. Moreover,
it is important to note that although social workers emphasize
the difference principle, none mention the reciprocity clause and
point out its shortcomings.
Least Advantaged People and Surfers
With regard to the main concern of this paper, that is, the
fate of long-term welfare recipients in the context of welfare
reform, Rawls's definition of least advantaged people is critically
problematic as well. For example, although the American society
has more than two classes, Rawls simplifies it by classifying
citizens into two groups: most or more advantaged and least
or less advantaged. Rawls goes through an elaborate process to
identify "the least advantaged" members of society (1971, pp. 95-
100; 1999a, pp. 83-86; 2001, pp. 57-60, p. 65, p. 139). However, he
finally defines least advantaged people as "those who share with
other citizens the basic equal liberties and fair opportunities but
have the least income and wealth" (2001, p. 65). In short, working
poor people, with minimum income, are the least advantaged
members of society.
It is important to note that Rawls is extremely cautious and
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highly respectful in venturing to define/identify least advan-
taged members of society. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement,
he provides a very elaborate explanation about his conceptual-
ization of least advantaged people, stating, "the term 'the least
advantaged' is not a rigid designator" (2001, p. 59, note #26).
Rather, Rawls continues, they are people who are worst off under
a particular scheme of cooperation because these same people
may not be the worst off in another scheme of cooperation. Thus,
he emphasizes that least advantaged people are defined only by
their "income and wealth;" they are never identifiable by gender,
race, or nationality. While this thoughtful respect is remarkable
because it prevents labeling people, it is also problematic because
it brackets empirical evidence showing the gender and color of
income and wealth (Oliver and Shapiro, 2000; Schorr, 2001; U. S.
Census Bureau, 2000).
"Surfers". Rawls writes very little about people who do not
work. Pieced together, it appears he classifies non-working poor
citizens as "surfers," or adults who are able but unwilling to work.
With regard to people on welfare, Rawls's discussion and words
are worth noting. In the context of work, he asks, "Are the least
advantaged, then, those who live on welfare and surf all day
off Malibu?" (2001, p. 179). He continues and answers that if so,
then, "surfers must somehow support themselves." Rawls does
not support public assistance for adults who do not contribute to
material production under any circumstance. He views "surfers"
or long-term welfare recipients as able but unwilling to work; he
does not discuss people's inability to work because he views all
citizens as normal, rational, and cooperating with a social system.
In Rawlsian justice, it is unfair for people to live off the labor of
others. Thus, non-working poor citizens who rely on welfare are
unworthy poor, marginalized in the purview of Rawlsian justice.
Grounds for Distributive Justice
In light of social workers' high regard for Rawls, it is worth
exploring if there is any concession in Rawlsian justice for non-
working poor people. A thorough reading (Rawls, 1999a; 2001)
indicates that only when people cooperate with the work require-
ment of his revised political conception of justice are they entitled
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to distributive justice. However, moral worth, redress, and need
are not grounds for his version of distributive social justice. Rawls
notes that he does not question the concept of moral worth. In
fact, when people conscientiously try and work but fail to make
ends meet, they deserve the social minimum, but sheer moral
worth of people does not qualify as a basis for justice. This is so
because in a pluralist society there are varying ideas about what
constitutes good character and action, and as such there cannot be
any universal agreement on moral worth. Also, Rawls considers
redress in his theory of justice, via the difference principle, but
clarifies, "the difference principle is not, the principle of redress.
It does not require society to move in the direction of an equality
of natural assets. We are not to try to even out handicaps as if all
were expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race" (Rawls,
1968/1999b, p. 166; 1999a; 2001).
Allocative and Distributive Justice Clarified. Last, he also rules out
need of any kind, whether basic or developmental, but accepts
"claims of need" arising out of work effort, and requires that
a social minimum be paid, as already noted. In the context of
need, it is instructive to note Rawls's clear and emphatic distinc-
tion between allocative and distributive justice. He explains that
allocative justice is concerned with the distribution of "a given
collection of goods" which is to be "divided among definite indi-
viduals with known desires and needs" (1999a, p. 77), and "who
have not cooperated in any way to provide those commodities"
(2001, p. 50). Rawls states that because the collection of goods that
is to be allocated is not "the product of these individuals," they
do not have any "prior claim" to the goods, and the collection
of goods can be distributed according to needs or desires (2001,
p. 50). Rawls strongly rejects allocative justice in his scheme of
distributive justice and reiterates this position in his final the-
sis on justice stating, "We reject the idea of allocative justice
as incompatible with the fundamental idea by which justice as
fairness is organized" (2001, p.50). He rejects allocative justice
primarily because it contradicts two of his basic assumptions
about citizens and the government: a) "society as a fair system
of social cooperation over time" where citizens work together
"to produce the social resources on which their claims are made"
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(Rawls, 2001, p. 50), and b) "reciprocity," an auxiliary idea in the
difference principle, wherein, inequalities benefit "others as well
as ourselves" (Rawls, 2001, p. 64).
Summary and Discussion
An Unexpected Finding: Welfare Reform Mirrors Rawlsian Justice
Clearly, social workers have no room to maneuver in Rawlsian
justice to help adults who are long-term welfare recipients get
justice as they envision it in the context of welfare reform. In fact,
certain elements of welfare reform mirror Rawlsian justice, and
as such welfare reform is not unjust. First, Rawlsian justice would
condone the work first stipulation of welfare reform because work
or wage employment in a market economy is the critical obliga-
tion of least advantaged people to reap the benefits of Rawlsian
distributive justice. Second, welfare reform and Rawlsian justice
are similar in that both view non-working poor adults as surfers-
able but unwilling to work and outside the domain of distributive
justice. Rawls' highly respectful and thoughtful, as well as equally
restrictive definition of least advantaged people as any working
poor citizen, non-identifiable by gender, race, ethnicity, marital
status, education, occupation, location, and history of poverty, be-
comes a pivotal ground for disqualifying millions of non-working
poor citizens from accessing justice both in Rawlsian justice and
in welfare reform.
Third, both welfare reform and the second principle of Rawl-
sian justice with its reciprocity clause are similar in that neither
has space for any extra expenditure to address long-term welfare
recipients' needs such as remedial education, vocational training,
higher education, or to attend to other personal, inter-personal,
and structural barriers that impede their ability to work. Such
extra expenditure would amount to allocative justice, which is
barred along with moral worth, need, and redress as grounds
for acquiring justice in Rawlsian justice. Thus, all citizens must
first contribute whatever they can to the material production of
society to access justice. Accordingly when citizens work but fail
to make ends meet, they are deserving of welfare assistance in
both Rawlsian justice and in welfare reform. Last, the federal five
year life time limit on welfare assistance eligibility, or less than five
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years as some states have stipulated, is different from Rawlsian
justice in that the latter does not have any time limit on availabil-
ity of the social minimum. In Rawlsian justice it is possible for
adults to work on any available menial job and simultaneously
rely on welfare assistance to bridge the gap between income
and expenses through out their lives. Despite this difference the
underlying message in either of the scenarios-welfare reform
or Rawlsian justice-is identical: work no matter what the job
circumstances demand of you or else figure out a way to survive
by yourself. In sum, Rawlsian justice and welfare reform both fail
to deliver justice as viewed and promoted by social workers to
non-working poor adults who are on welfare for long.
Discussion
Given social workers' historic reliance on Rawls to promote
justice, it is surprising to find that Rawlsian justice cannot help
us intervene on behalf of long-term welfare recipients to promote
justice as we understand it. This finding raises many questions
among which two are: a) why does Rawlsian justice continue to be
extolled in our literature as a viable means for promoting justice
for poor people in general and people facing welfare reform
in particular (Reisch, 2002), when Rawls's revised and clarified
vision of justice differs from our vision of justice? b) in light of this
new understanding of Rawlsian justice, what can we do to help
long-term welfare recipients get justice as we conceptualize it?
A possible answer to the first question may be attributed to
the difficulties in reading Rawls first hand and understanding his
extremely elaborate explication of social justice. Some social work
scholars clearly understand Rawls's 1971 theory of justice and
critique it appropriately (Wakefield, 1988a; 1988b; Reisch, 2002;
Reisch and Taylor, 1983), as well as apply it cautiously (Wakefield,
1988a). However, the brevity of their criticism and cautions about
Rawlsian justice undermines the seriousness of their comments
when they also devote extensive space to apply it to social work
problems. Thus, it may be hard for social workers in general to
understand the implication of these brief comments. So it is likely
we apply Rawls to our varied problems because some social work
stalwarts have promoted Rawls in our social justice literature.
And new comers to the social work justice literature may inad-
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vertently believe that Rawlsian justice provides answers to all our
issues, as this author mistakenly did. If this answer is plausible,
it implies that we need to update our social justice literature to
reflect Rawls's revised thinking about justice and promote Rawls
for our purposes only when applicable, and perhaps with even
more caution. It needs to be noted that the revised Rawlsian justice
is not applicable to adults who do not work, as well as people with
chronic and persistent mental illness, health issues, and substance
abuse issue who may not work.
On the other hand, some social workers may believe that
Rawls's (2001) revised political conceptualization of justice which
requires all adults to work in order to access social justice may
appear harsh for some social workers, but it is still acceptable
to them. Such a scenario may lead to three camps among social
workers: pro-Rawls, against-Rawls, and the go-between Rawl-
sians. The pro-Rawlsians may then more clearly articulate work
preparation and work obligation as required grounds for getting
justice and push their agenda accordingly. Those who find them-
selves against the revised Rawlsian theory of justice may find
it harsh because social workers have and continue to promote
justice on grounds of need, moral worth, redress and distributive
justice. Some of them, such as Reisch (2002) even in his most
recent incorporation of obligation to society, represented as mu-
tuality, merely refers to peoples' "capacity to repay ... society...
at some time, in some way." This may be too soft an understanding
of reciprocity from the pro-Rawlsian social workers' perspective
because Rawlsian reciprocity requires hard work from adults to
gain access to distributive justice or welfare. Thus, this second
group may need to re-think their future promotion of Rawls in
the social work literature.
The go-between Rawlsian social workers may take a strategic
position where they may subscribe to the overall notion of Rawl-
sian distributive justice in general but prefer to forsake Rawls
to promote justice for long-term welfare recipients. In light of
the centrality of work obligation to acquire justice in mainstream
politics, and our professional acknowledgement of the value of
work in people's lives, they may intervene in the welfare reform
debate, as well as in their varied capacities help long-term welfare
recipients become more capable of working. For example, in the
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welfare reform debate they can promote the idea of redress for
cumulative capability deprivation as a basis for rethinking work
first and time limit for all long-term welfare recipients. They
can substantiate with research findings that long-term welfare
recipients want to work, but need much help to do so (Anderson et
al, 2004; Banerjee, 2003; Taylor and Barusch, 2004). If it is essential
to cite justice theorists to strengthen their advocacy argument,
they can draw on other contemporary and well-regarded justice
theorists whose views are more on par with our social justice
concerns such as Barry (2002), Nussbaum (2000), Sen, (1999) and
Young (2000).
Drawing from these welfare justice theorists' base, they could
strengthen their arguments about social justice for long-term wel-
fare recipients and argue that there are many more diversities and
capability deprivations among poor people than what Rawlsian
justice or welfare reform acknowledges. Thus, all citizens may
have equal opportunities for education and work, but people
who are long-term welfare recipients lack the institutional con-
ditions and resource supports to allow them to acquire these
opportunities, and face many more personal, inter-personal, and
structural barriers to capability development than others (An-
derson et al, 2004; Taylor and Barusch, 2004). Thus, it is unjust
to expect personal responsibility for work when society and life's
circumstances outside of one's control do not permit some people,
especially people of color and particularly women, to develop
their capabilities. They can point out that the capabilities that
a person has depend to a large extent on social arrangements,
and as such the government and larger society cannot escape
this responsibility. Instead of marginalizing or stigmatizing non-
working poor adults even further by setting them outside the
scope of justice, they need to be included in the main text of justice.
To accomplish this latter task, they can strategize and work
more effectively in various micro-macro interventions towards
enhancing the capabilities and sense of empowerment of people
who are long-term welfare recipients. Also, they can strategize
and collaborate with inter-disciplinary personnel to address such
people's needs and enhance their well-being. Another strategy
can focus on greater social work involvement in the world of
poor people's education and work-vocational education, wage
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employment, self-employment, income packaging. In the long
run, these varied strategies together can help poor people become
more capable individuals, escape the label of being long-term
welfare recipients, and allow them to thrive in their chosen fields
of work and life.
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